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Typical incomplete markets models in international economics make two assumptions. First, house-
holds are not able to fully insure themselves against country-speciﬁc shocks. Second, there is a
representative household within each country, so that households are fully insured against idiosyn-
cratic shocks. We assume instead that cross-household risk-sharing is limited within countries, but
cross-country risk-sharing is complete. We consider two types of limited risk-sharing: domestically
incomplete markets (DI) and private information-Pareto optimal (PIPO) risk-sharing. We show
that the models imply distinct restrictions between the cross-sectional distributions of consumption
and real exchange rates. We evaluate these restrictions using household-level consumption data from
the United States and the United Kingdom. We show that the PIPO restriction ﬁts the data well
when households have a coeﬃc i e n to fr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o no fa r o u n d5 .T h ea n a l o g o u sr e s t r i c t i o n s
implied by the representative agent model and the DI model are rejected at conventional levels of
signiﬁcance.
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System.1. Introduction
It is increasingly common in international economics to use incomplete markets models.
In these models, countries are aﬀected by shocks, but asset markets are insuﬃciently rich to
allow agents to insure themselves against these shocks. In the extreme, agents within the
model can only trade a risk-free bond.
Virtually all of these models are representative agent models, in which agents are
assumed to be identical within a country. This treatment creates a peculiar asymmetry. On
the one hand, the identicalness of agents within a country implicitly means that they are able
to insure themselves fully against person-speciﬁc shocks, like unemployment or disability. On
the other hand, the incompleteness of markets means that these same agents are unable to
trade assets that pay oﬀ contingent on country-speciﬁc shocks — shocks that are typically
fully observable and non-manipulable.
In this paper, we take the opposite approach. We assume that markets are complete
with respect to country-speciﬁc shocks, so that agents are able to insure themselves fully
against these aggregate shocks. However, we assume that they are only able to partially
insure themselves against individual-speciﬁc skill shocks. This limited insurance creates ex-
post heterogeneity across individuals and means that there is no sense in which there is a
representative agent within each country.
We use this approach to address a particular anomaly: the Backus and Smith (1993)
real exchange rate puzzle. Backus and Smith (1993) consider a world in which there is a
representative agent in each country, only some goods are tradeable, and ﬁnancial markets are
complete. In this setting, they prove that the growth rate in the real exchange rate between
any two countries should equal the diﬀerence in the growth rates of marginal utilities of therepresentative consumers. Crucially, this equality is not just true on average, but rather in
all dates and states. They document that this implication is strongly falsiﬁed in the data. In
particular, real exchange rates are much more volatile and persistent than the corresponding
ratios of marginal utilities.1
To address the Backus-Smith puzzle, we study an economy in which agents are faced
with skill shocks that aﬀect their ability to transform eﬀort into output. The agents are able to
insure themselves fully against country-speciﬁc shocks, but only partially insure themselves
against their individual-speciﬁc skill shocks. We consider two forms of partial insurance
against these shocks. The ﬁrst we call domestically incomplete markets (DI). Under this
form of partial insurance, agents sequentially trade assets and goods. The assets consist of
claims that pay oﬀ contingent on aggregate shocks to their country or any other. Hence,
the agents in the model are unable to directly insure themselves against individual-speciﬁc
shocks.
The second we call private information, Pareto optimal (PIPO). Under this formula-
tion, agents are able to sign insurance contracts that completely insure themselves against
their skill shocks, subject to the incentive compatibility constraint generated by the restric-
tion that the realizations of the shocks are private information. The insurance companies are
then allowed to trade on the agents’ behalf in the sequential asset/goods markets described
above.
Our theoretical results parallel those of Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2005). As in
1Colacito and Croce (2005) modify the Backus-Smith model in two ways: they allow preferences to be
of the Epstein-Zin (1989) form, and they incorporate a small, highly persistent component in consumption
growth rates. They do not directly evaluate their model in terms of the Backus-Smith puzzle, but do argue
that the model does a better job in explaining other aspects of real exchange rate data.
2t h a tp a p e r ,w ea r ea b l et od e r i v eo u rk e yﬁndings while imposing only minimal assumptions
on the stochastic process generating individual-level or country-level shocks. Let γ be the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion of the various agents, let e
jk
t be the real exchange rate
between country j and k,a n dl e tC
j
ηt be the ηth moment of the cross-sectional distribution of
consumption in country j. (Throughout the paper, the term “moment” refers to non-central








where ∆ is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator. This formula says that the growth rate of the real
exchange rate between country j and k equals the diﬀerence in the growth rates between
country j and k of the negative γ-th moments of their cross-sectional consumption distribu-
tions. In the PIPO setup, the growth rate of the real exchange rate between country j and
k equals the diﬀerence in the growth rates between country k and j of the γ-th moments of








Note that if the cross-sectional consumption distribution is degenerate, then both PIPO and
DI are equivalent to Backus and Smith’s characterization.
We next use household-level data on consumption expenditures from the United States
(the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)) and the United Kingdom (the Family Expendi-
ture Survey (FES)) to assess the validity of these restrictions. A key diﬃculty here is that we
3only have a sample of households, not the full population. This means that, unlike Backus
and Smith (1993), we cannot directly compare the growth rate of the real exchange rates to
the diﬀerence in the growth rates of the various moments of the consumption distribution.
We use the following procedure. We create an error term by subtracting the diﬀerence in the
growth rates of the appropriate moments of the consumption distributions from the growth
rate of the real exchange rate. We regress this error term on the growth rate of the real ex-
change rate. Under the null hypothesis, the error term is due only to cross-sectional sampling
error and the regression coeﬃcient should be zero.
We examine this implication for the representative agent model, the DI model, and
the PIPO model for various values of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. The regression
coeﬃcient is non-zero, and is in fact close to 1, for realistic parameterizations of the represen-
tative agent model and the incomplete markets models. However, the regression coeﬃcient
is zero when we use the PIPO model with γ approximately equal to 5.
We conclude that the PIPO model is able to account for movements in real exchange
rates, at least if we set γ to be approximately 5. It is interesting to compare this result with
our ﬁnding for U.S. asset pricing data in Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2005). There, we ﬁnd
that the PIPO model does a good job of accounting for the equity premium when γ is also
around 5, while the other two models are not able to account for the equity premium. The
similarity of the ﬁn d i n g ss t r i k e su sa sh i g h l ys u g g e s t i v e .
The Backus-Smith puzzle has received a great deal of attention recently. Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2002) explore the ability of an incomplete markets model with a represen-
tative agent in each country to explain the puzzle. They show that their model signiﬁcantly
overpredicts the correlation between relative consumptions and the real exchange rate. More
4recently, Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2005) have augmented the model of Chari et al. (2002)
by assuming that there are nontrivial distribution costs associated with non-traded goods.
In contrast to Chari et al., Corsetti et al. show that their model is able to rationalize the low
correlation between relative consumptions and real exchange rates that is so puzzling from
the perspective of the Backus-Smith complete markets setup.2 In both of these papers, the
authors assume that agents can only trade risk-free bonds across countries.
We view our paper as complementary to Chari et al. (2002) and Corsetti et al. (2005).
As we have stressed, our modeling approach is quite diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h e i r s .B u tw ea l s od i ﬀer in
methodology. These papers solve for a full dynamic stochastic general equilibrium, given an
exogenous speciﬁcation of productivity shocks, and compare some aspects of this equilibrium
to the data. We undertake a diﬀerent kind of exercise. We assume that household-level
consumption is consistent with the implications of our model(s), and then, conditional on
that assumption, evaluate the models’ implications for real exchange rates.
2. A Multi-Country Environment
Consider an economy with J countries and (T+1)periods. Time is indexed 0,1,2,...T;
period 0 is a contracting/trading period in which no production or consumption takes place.
Each country has a unit measure of agents. A typical agent has expected utility preferences,













t )},0 <β<1,0 <γ
2See also Benigno and Thoenissen (2004) for a similar approach.
5Here, cTR
t is the agent’s period t consumption of a tradeable good that is available in all
countries and cNT
t is the agent’s consumption of a non-tradeable good speciﬁct oh i sc o u n t r y . 3
The variables lTR
t and lNT
t represent the agent’s labor in the tradeable goods and non-tradeable
goods sectors, respectively. We also assume that the partial derivatives of u are positive, that
the own second derivatives of u are negative, and that u is homogeneous of degree one.
There are two kinds of shocks in the economy: public aggregate shocks and private
idiosyncratic shocks. The ﬁrst kind of shocks works as follows. Let Z be a ﬁnite set, and let
Ψ be a probability density over ZT that assigns positive probability to all elements of ZT.A t
the beginning of period 1, an element zT of ZT is drawn according to Ψ. The random vector
zT is the sequence of public aggregate shocks; zt is the realization of the shock in period t.
The idiosyncratic shocks work as follows in country j.L e tΘ be a ﬁnite set, and let
πj be a probability density deﬁned over ΘT. At the beginning of period 1, an element of
ΘT is drawn for each agent according to the density πj. Conditional on zT, the draws are
independent across agents and πj is the same for all realizations of zT; we require πj(θ
T) > 0
for all θ
T in ΘT. We assume that a law of large numbers applies across agents: conditional on
any zT, the measure of agents in the population of country j with type θ
T is given by πj(θ
T).
Any given agent learns the realization of zt and his own θt at the beginning of period
t and not before. Thus, at the beginning of period t, the agent knows his own private history
θ
t =( θ1,...,θt) and the history of public shocks zt =( z1,...,zt). This implies that his choices
in period t can only be a function of this history.
The individual-speciﬁc and aggregate shocks jointly determine skills. In period t, an
3We follow Backus and Smith (1993) in considering an economy with one costlessly tradeable good and a
non-tradeable good. However, we could readily extend our analysis to allow for the presence of other goods
which are tradeable, but only by paying a stochastic good-speciﬁc iceberg cost.
6agent in country j produces output yi














t → (0,∞) (2)
We assume that an agent’s output in either sector is observable at time t, but his labor
input is known only to him. We refer to φ
i,j
t (θ
t,zt) as a country j agent’s skill in sector i in
history (θ
t,zt).





















t,zt) is the amount of sector i output that an agent in country j with shock history
θ
t produces, given that the public shock history is zt. Similarly, c
ij
t (θ
t,zt) is the amount of
sector i goods consumption for an agent in country j with shock history θ
t, given that the




































t) for all j (6)
Because θt is only privately observable, allocations must respect incentive-compatibility
conditions. (The following deﬁnitions correspond closely to those in Golosov, Kocherlakota




T0,zT). An agent can alter his consumption and labor by
changing his reporting strategy. Suppose the allocation is (c,y). If an agent in country j uses




































Let Vj(σ;c,y) be the ex-ante utility that a country j agent receives from using strategy σ. Let
σTT be the truth-telling strategy σTT(θ
T,zT)=( θ
T,zT) for all θ
T,zT. Then, an allocation
(c,y) is incentive-compatible if
Vj(σTT;c,y) ≥ Vj(σ;c,y) for all j and all σ.
An allocation which is incentive-compatible and feasible is said to be incentive-feasible.
3. Real Exchange Rates
Given this deﬁnition of the environment, we now examine the properties of real ex-
change rates in two diﬀerent trading setups. In the ﬁrst setup, agents trade a complete set of
zt-contingent securities directly with one another. In the second setup, intermediaries trade
a complete set of zt-contingent securities on behalf of the agents. In this latter formulation,
8the intermediaries directly insure the agents against the realization of the θ shocks, given
that they are private information. We derive useful necessary conditions of equilibrium in
both settings.
In both setups, we use the following notation. For all t,zt, let pTR
t (zt) be the price of
tradeable goods in public history zt,a n dl e tp
NT,j
t (zt) be the price of non-tradeable goods in
public history zt in country j. Both prices are denominated in terms of a common numeraire
(for concreteness, suppose they are quoted in dollars). A crucial element of our analysis is the
notion of a price index. Given price processes (pTR,p NT,j) for the tradeable and non-tradeable
goods, deﬁne the price index process p
j
t to be the minimal amount of expenditure necessary
























We can then deﬁne the real exchange rate between country j and country k to be the ratio










(Note that if there were no non-tradeable goods, then the real exchange rate would always
be one.)

































Thus, an agent’s total expenditure equals his momentary utility multiplied by the price index.
A. Domestically Incomplete Markets
Suppose that at each date t =0 ,1,2,...(T − 1), all agents can trade a complete set of
zt+1-contingent securities that pay oﬀ in terms of the numeraire good. (The date 0 is added
simply to allow agents to trade before the realization of uncertainty in period 1.) Fix agents’
labor choices at their individually optimal levels. Then, the choice problem of a typical agent




































































t+1 represents the agent’s state contingent purchases and qt+1(zt+1|zt) is the history
zt price of a claim to consumption in history zt+1. The static ﬁrst-order necessary conditions












































t,zt) is the multiplier on the history (θ










t,zt)) As well, u
j
i,t(θ
t,zt) is the marginal utility of an agent in country
j with respect to good i (i = TR,NT)i nh i s t o r y(θ













As we shall see, our data contain observations on expenditures for each household and
on the price index in each country. For each household with history (θ
t,zt), deﬁne its real



















Note that (7) implies that the household’s real consumption c
j
t(θ






















































This particular restriction on the behavior of the real exchange rate is not economet-
rically useful, because the multipliers are not observable. As in Backus and Smith (1993),
though, the assumption of complete markets (with respect to aggregate shocks) imposes
sharp restrictions on the behavior of the multipliers. In particular, agents must satisfy the



























































B. Private Information-Pareto Optimal Equilibrium
It is well-known from the work of Green (1987) and others that in the above trading
structure, equilibrium allocations are not Pareto optimal, even given the restriction that skills
are private information. In this subsection, we describe an alternative trading mechanism
such that the equilibrium allocation is (constrained) Pareto optimal. This trading protocol
is similar to that described in Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006) (and originally in Atkeson and
Lucas (1992)).
In period 0, insurance companies compete by oﬀering contracts that specify consump-
tion and output as a function of agents’ reports. These contracts feature full commitment
on the part of both sides. At the same time, the insurance companies trade a complete set
of zt-contingent assets with one another. Then, at each date, the companies trade tradeable
and non-tradeable goods in each country. Let qt(zt) be the price of a claim to the numeraire
good in public history zt in terms of the numeraire good in period 0.
In the contract market, the agents receive some equilibrium level of utility. The proﬁt-
maximizing insurance companies structure contracts so as to minimize the costs of providing
13that utility. Let y∗ be the output process speciﬁed by the equilibrium contract. Then, the























































j∗;σ) for all σ.
Here, uj
∗ is the equilibrium level of ex-ante utility that agents receive from consumption
contracts in country j.
It is straightforward to see that the insurance company equates individual intratem-

















The insurance company’s intertemporal ﬁrst-order conditions can be derived as in Proposition

































0 is independent of z1. In both of these sets of ﬁrst-order conditions, we are using the
notation of the prior subsection.

































so that the price index in country j equals the price of tradeable goods divided by the marginal
utility of tradeable goods.
Because u i sh o m o g e n e o u so fd e g r e eo n ea n dt h eo w ns e c o n dd e r i v a t i v e so fu are
negative, uTR/uNT is a strictly decreasing function of cTR,j/cNT,j. Because the relative prices







t,zt) are actually independent of θ
t. Hence, we can pull
1/u
j

























w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a ti ne q u i l i b r i u m ,r e a lc o n s u m p t i o nc
j
t(θ





15By integrating over θ













































C. Three Models and Their Implications for Real Exchange Rates
In this subsection, we use the above results to derive the key testable implication for
real exchange rates of three diﬀerent trading models. In what follows, we use the notation
C
j
ηt(zt) to refer to the cross-sectional η-th (non-central) moment of consumption in country
j and history zt.


























By taking logs and ﬁrst diﬀerences, we get the key implication of domestically incomplete











where ∆ is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence operator.
























Finally, we derive the restrictions of the representative agent model. Suppose that Θ
is a singleton, so that there is only a single type of agent in each country. Under either the











17The growth rate of the real exchange rate is equal to the diﬀerence in growth rates of per
capita real consumption, multiplied by the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. This formula
is the same as that of Backus-Smith (1993).
The key diﬀerence between these three restrictions is how cross-sectional consumption
inequality is connected to real exchange rates. In (RA), only per capita consumption enters
the restriction. Hence, consumption inequality does not aﬀect real exchange rates at all.
In contrast, in (DI), Ck
−γt(zt) is the mean of a convex function of household consump-
tion. This moment increases when inequality increases. Hence, the real exchange rate e
jk
t
grows faster when inequality in country k grows faster relative to that in country j.I n t u -
itively, when inequality in country k grows faster, agents are facing more idiosyncratic risk
in that country. This change means that there is a growing precautionary demand for goods
in country k, which makes goods grow relatively more valuable in country k.
In (PIPO), −Ck
γt(zt) is the mean of a concave function of household consumption (at
least when γ>1, which is the empirically relevant range). This moment decreases when
inequality increases. Hence, the real exchange rate between country j and k grows slower
when inequality in country k grows faster relative to that in country j. The intuition for this
eﬀect comes from incentives. Consider a country in which one agent has accumulated almost
all of the wealth in the society. It is hard to provide suﬃcient incentive to get this agent to
produce. But, because of curvature of utility, it is relatively easy to provide incentives to get
the large number of (possibly high-skilled) poor agents to produce. It follows that goods are
relatively less valuable in high-inequality countries.
184. Measurement Error and Sampling Error
If we had observations on consumption expenditures for all households in country j
and k, we could directly test (DI), (PIPO), and (RA). However, there are two problems
with this procedure. First, household consumption expenditures are probably measured with
error. Second, we do not have access to the full population of all households. We consider
each problem in turn. The discussion of measurement error is essentially the same as that of
Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2005).
Suppose that in country j, household j’s consumption expenditure is measured with

















t=1 is a stationary stochastic process, where {ξ
j
t}T
t=1 is i.i.d. over households
and independent of zT. Assume too that ξ
j





















Under these conditions on ξ
j








19The ﬁrst-diﬀerence of logged cross-sectional moments of mismeasured consumption data, with
measurement error ξ,i st h es a m ea st h eﬁrst-diﬀerence of logged cross-sectional moments of
true consumption data. The key to this result is the assumption that the measurement error
ξ
j is stationary over time, so that the distribution of errors across households is the same in
all dates and states. Note that this does not mean that ξ
j
t is i.i.d. over time.
This analysis provides a justiﬁcation for us to ignore the presence of measurement





























If the sample error is identically zero, it is possible to compare the marginal distribution
of the left-hand side of equations like (RA) to the analogous properties of the right-hand
side. For example, Backus and Smith (1993) compare the variance and autocorrelation of
real exchange rates to the variance and autocorrelation of the diﬀerence in growth rates
of marginal utilities. They conclude that these properties of real exchange rates are quite
diﬀerent from the corresponding properties of the right-hand side of (RA). It is not possible
to proceed in this fashion when sampling error is nontrivial; the properties of the right-hand
side will be at least aﬀe c t e d ,a n dp o s s i b l yo v e r w h e l m e d ,b ys a m p l i n ge r r o r . 4
4Brandt, Cochrane, and Santa-Clara (2005) derive necessary conditions for two country-speciﬁc stochastic
discount factors to be simultaneously consistent with real exchange rates and with high within-country equity
premia. They show that the stochastic discount factors must necessarily be highly correlated with one
another. Unfortunately, the sampling error issue means that we cannot evaluate this implication for our








































where the bars represent sample moments as opposed to population moments. Under the























γt(zt)), conditional on zt, is zero. It follows




t,DI are both uncorrelated with ∆e
jk
t .





t ,w e s h o u l d g e t a s l o p e c o e ﬃcient of zero. Similarly, under the null that the PIPO






t should result in a slope coef-
ﬁcient of zero. In contrast, if we obtain a slope coeﬃcient near 1, we can conclude that the
models are not faring well: there is little empirical relationship between the left-hand and
right-hand sides of the relevant exchange rate restrictions.
SDFs.
215. Data Description
In this section, we describe the data that we used. We begin with the real exchange
rates, and then turn to the two household consumption data sets.
A. Real Exchange Rates
We constructed the monthly real exchange rate between the United States and the
United Kingdom as follows. We began with the International Financial Statistics data on the
monthly average of daily pound-dollar exchange rates.5 We then divided this exchange rate
by the monthly United Kingdom Consumer Price Index (for all items). We then multiplied
this exchange rate by the monthly United States Consumer Price Index (for all items). All
CPIs are in 2000 basis. The source for both of these price index series was the OECD Monthly
Indicators (2005, vol. 7).6 In this way, we construct a monthly series for the real exchange
rate between the United States and the United Kingdom.
B. The CEX
The following description closely follows that in Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2005).
The micro data for the United States are drawn from the 1980-2004 Consumer Expen-
diture Survey (CEX). The CEX provides a continuous and comprehensive ﬂow of data on the
buying habits of American consumers. The data are collected by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics and used primarily for revising the Consumer Price Index. Consumer units are deﬁned
as members of a household related by blood, marriage, adoption, or other legal arrangement,
single person living alone or sharing a household with others, or two or more persons living
5The series code is 112..AE.ZF....
6The UK price level is reported in series GBR.CPALTT01.IXOB. The US price level is reported in series
USA.CPALTT01.IXOB.
22together who are ﬁnancially dependent. The deﬁn i t i o no ft h eh e a do ft h eh o u s e h o l di nt h e
CEX is the person or one of the persons who owns or rents the unit.
The CEX is based on two components, the Diary, or record-keeping survey, and the
Interview survey. The Diary sample interviews households for two consecutive weeks, and
it is designed to obtain detailed expenditures data on small and frequently purchased items,
such as food, personal care, and household supplies. The Interview sample is in the form of
a rotating panel, and it follows survey households for a maximum of ﬁve quarters, although
only inventory and basic sample data are collected in the ﬁrst quarter (these data are not
publicly available). The database covers about 95% of all expenditure, with the exclusion of
expenditures for housekeeping supplies, personal care products, and non-prescription drugs.
Following most previous research, our analysis below uses only the Interview sample.
The CEX collects information on a variety of socio-demographic variables, including
characteristics of members, characteristics of housing unit, geographic information, inventory
of household appliances, work experience and earnings of members, unearned income, taxes,
and other receipts of consumer unit, credit balances, assets and liabilities, occupational ex-
penses and cash contributions of consumer unit. Expenditure is reported in each interview
(after the ﬁrst) and refers to the months of the previous quarter. Thus, a household inter-
viewed in April 1980 reports expenditure for January, February, and March 1980. Income is
reported in the second and ﬁfth interview, and it refers to the previous 12 months. Holdings
of ﬁnancial assets are reported only in the ﬁfth interview.
Our sample selections are aimed at eliminating the most severe reporting errors in con-
sumption. We end up discarding about 25% of observations through our selection procedure.
The deﬁnition of total non-durable consumption is similar to Attanasio and Weber (1995). It
23includes food (at home and away from home), alcoholic beverages and tobacco, heating fuels
and utilities, transports (including gasoline), personal care, clothing and footwear, entertain-
ments, and other services (including domestic services). It excludes expenditure on various
durables, housing (furniture, appliances, etc.), education, and health. We refer the reader to
the Appendix for step-to-step details on sample selection and consumption deﬁnition.
We “deﬂate” consumption data to account for three phenomena: price diﬀerences over
time, seasonal diﬀerences (i.e., month eﬀects) within a year, and households’ demographic
diﬀerences at a certain point in time. Thus, nondurable consumption is ﬁrst expressed in
real terms using the CPI (all items) described above. Then, data are de-seasonalized by
simple multiplicative regression adjustments. Finally, we convert it into adult-equivalent
consumption data.7 Given the overlapping panel nature of the CEX, each month a certain
number of households enter the panel and an approximately equal number leave it. Monthly
consumption data are aggregated to form quarterly consumption data for each household
in the sample.8 Thus, the CEX provides us with a monthly sample of household quarterly
consumption.
7The number of adult equivalents is deﬁned as (A + αK)
β ,w h e r eA is the number of adults (aged
18 or more), K the number of kids, and α and β parameters. We set α =0 .7 and β =0 .65 (following
recommendations contained in Citro and Michaels, 1995, which in turn draws from Betson, 1990). Similar
results are obtained if we use a more sophisticated Engel approach.
8Recently, researchers have noted that for many commodities, the aggregation of CEX data matches poorly
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) data. Some of
the discrepancy is undoubtedly due to diﬀerences in covered population and deﬁnitional issues. But the
amount of underestimation of consumer expenditure is sometimes substantial, and it raises some important
warning ﬂags. Furthermore, there is evidence that the detachment between the CEX aggregate and the NIPA
PCE has increased over time. At present, it is not clear why this is so, and whether this is necessarily due
to a worsening in the quality of the CEX. For example, Bosworth et al. (1991) conclude that most of the
discrepancy is explained by the failure of the CEX to sample the super-rich; others have suggested a greater
incidence of attrition. According to the BLS, however, the CEX has maintained representativeness of the US
population over time, and attrition has not changed much since the redesign of the survey of the early 1980s.
24C. The FES
The micro data for the UK come from the 1975—1999 Family Expenditure Survey
(FES). The FES, conducted by the Oﬃce for National Statistics, surveys a random sample
of households in the UK. The FES is primarily a survey of household expenditure on goods
and services, and household income. Similarly to the CEX, the main goal of the survey
was originally that of providing information on spending patterns for revising the Consumer
Price Index. However, with time the survey has become multi-purpose, providing a wealth
of information on household economic and social variables, such as household composition,
size, social class, occupation, etc.
The FES has been in operation since 1957 and up to and including 1993, data are
available by calendar year. From 1994—1995 data are available by ﬁnancial year (April—
March). The basic unit of the survey is the household. Starting with 2000—2001, a household
is deﬁned as a group of people living at the same address with common housekeeping, i.e.,
sharing household expenses such as food and bills, or sharing a living room. Before 2000, the
deﬁnition of household required both common housekeeping and a shared living room. On
average, about 7,000 households are interviewed each year. Each individual in the household
aged 16 or more is asked to keep diary records of daily expenditure for two weeks. Information
about regular expenditure, such as rent and mortgage payments, is obtained from a household
interview along with retrospective information on certain large, infrequent expenditures such
as those on vehicles. Data arerh collected throughout the year to cover seasonal variations
in expenditures.
The FES consists of three main modules, a Household Schedule, an Income Schedule,
and Diary Records. The Household Schedule is taken at the main interview. Information for
25most of the questions is obtained from the head of household (or housewife). Information is
collected about the household, the sex and age of each member, and also details about the
type and size of the household accommodation. The main part of the questionnaire relates
to expenditure both of a household and an individual nature, but the questions are mainly
conﬁned to expenses of a recurring nature.
The Income Schedule data are collected for each household spender. The schedule
is concerned with income, national insurance contributions, and income tax. Information
collected includes: employment status and recent absences from work, earnings of an em-
ployee, self-employed earnings, National Insurance contributions, pensions and other regular
allowances, occasional beneﬁts, social security beneﬁts and other types, investment income,
miscellaneous earnings of a “once-only” character, tax paid directly to Inland Revenue or
refunded, and income of a child.
The Diary Records cover 14 days. As said, each household member aged 16 or more is
asked to record all expenditure made during the 14 days. As for the CEX, we refer the reader
to the Appendix for step-to-step details on sample selection and consumption deﬁnition. The
deﬁnition of total non-durable consumption is as in Attanasio and Weber (1993), and it is
meant to be comparable to the one for the CEX.
Similarly to the CEX, the FES data we construct are “deﬂa t e d ”t oa c c o u n tf o rp r i c e
diﬀerences over time, seasonal diﬀerences (i.e., month eﬀects) within a year, and households’
demographic diﬀerences at a certain point in time. Thus, nondurable consumption is ﬁrst
expressed in real terms using the CPI (all items) described above (on the same basis as the
US CPI). Then, data are de-seasonalized by simple multiplicative regression adjustments.
Finally, we convert it into adult-equivalent consumption data. Given that data are provided
26for only two weeks, we multiply FES expenditure by 6.5 to form quarterly consumption data
for each household in the sample.9
As stated above, the FES randomly selects households throughout the year. The
survey keeps track of those households’ consumption expenditures for a two week period.
We identify households interviewed in a certain month as those completing their two-week
reporting in that month. We treat their (scaled-up) non-durable consumptions as being a
random sample of household consumption over the prior quarter.
6. Estimation Results
We have data from the FES from 1975—1999 and data from the CEX from 1980—2004.
We use data from the period 1980—1999. From the FES and the CEX, we have monthly
random samples of quarterly household consumption. Given the nature of these data, when
we ﬁrst diﬀerence, we subtract the observation from month (t−3) from the observation from
month t. Thus, the structure of our sample is that we have monthly observations on quarterly
ﬁrst-diﬀerences; the calculation of standard errors must take into account this overlapping
structure.
I nT a b l e1 ,w er e p o r tt h er e s u l t so fr e g r e s s i n gχ
US,UK
t,j ,a sd e ﬁned in (14)—(16) on the
ﬁrst diﬀerenced logged real exchange rate between the United States and the United Kingdom.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation induced by the use
of overlapping data using a correction of the form proposed by Hansen and Hodrick (1980).
9As far as reliability is concerned, great care is taken in collecting information from households and
comprehensive checks are applied during processing, so that errors in recording and processing are minimized.
The main factors that aﬀect the reliability of the survey results are sampling variability, non-response bias
and some incorrect reporting of certain items of expenditure and income. Procedures are in place to ensure
that users are provided with high quality data. For example, quality control is carried out to ensure that any
outliers are genuine, and checks are made on any unusual changes in average spending compared with the
previous year.
27However, we downweight longer lags as in Newey and West (1987) to obtain positive deﬁnite
covariance matrices.
Look ﬁrst at the representative agent results. The estimated coeﬃcients are all sta-
tistically insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, but statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
This column conﬁrms Backus and Smith’s results: the diﬀerence in per-capita consump-
tion growth rates between the United States and United Kingdom has little to do with real
exchange rates.
Next, look at the PIPO results. When γ is low (in the range 1—4), the estimated
regression coeﬃcient is close to 1. For these values of γ,as in the representative agent case, the
model seems to have little bite. But for γ near 5, the estimated regression coeﬃcient is zero.
The diﬀerence in the growth rates of the 5-th moments of the cross-sectional consumption
distribution tracks the real exchange rate well.
Finally, look at the DI results. Here, the estimated regression coeﬃcients are all
positive, and they grow larger with γ, not smaller. However, as is true in the PIPO case,
sampling error is large. Hence, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the true
regression coeﬃcient is zero for high values of γ.
In Table 1 we do not formally estimate γ. In contrast, in Table 2, we deﬁne α to be
the intercept term of the regression of χ
US,UK
t,j on the logged ﬁrst-diﬀerenced real exchange
rate. We then use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to obtain estimates of α and
of the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ. For the PIPO model, the estimate of γ is close to
5, as indicated in Table 1. However, the standard error is high. In the DI case, the estimate
that makes the moment condition as close as possible to zero is around 3. The usual GMM
estimate of the standard error is undeﬁned because the (one) moment condition is not set
28equal to zero in sample. Finally, in the RA case, the estimate of γ is negative (but highly
imprecise).
In Tables 1 and 2, we exploited the restriction that the slope coeﬃcient is supposed
to be zero in the regression under the null hypothesis. Since we have one parameter and
one restriction, the models are exactly identiﬁed. However, under the null hypothesis, the
intercept term is also supposed to be zero. In Table 3, we exploit this second restriction. We




















The results of this estimation oﬀer more evidence in favor of the PIPO model. In the PIPO
model, the estimated value of γ is again around 5. The estimate of γ is around 2 for the DI
model and around 0.2 for the RA model. All of these estimates, in particular in the RA case,
are imprecise. More interestingly, the J-statistic is very large for the DI and RA models; they
w o u l db o t hb er e j e c t e da ts t a n d a r dl e v e l so fs i g n i ﬁcance. In contrast, the J-statistic for the
PIPO model is small.
In Figure 1 we give a visual representation of the goodness of ﬁto ft h ev a r i o u sm o d e l s .
We use the estimate of γ from Table 3 to create an estimate of the right hand side of (DI)
(we repeat this for the other two models (PIPO) and (RA)). We then regress this onto the
growth of the real exchange rate (the left hand side of the equation). If the model ﬁts well,
the projection of this regression should be close to the growth of the real exchange rate. The
29ﬁgure shows that the PIPO ﬁts extremely well, while the other two models ﬁt the growth of
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t er a t h e rp o o r l y .
We did two robustness checks on our results. In constructing the real exchange rates
and the real consumption data, we use the Consumer Price Index based on all consumption
goods. However, we actually restrict attention to non-durable consumption goods. For this
reason, it would be desirable to use an index based only on non-durable consumption goods.
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,w eh a v en o tb e e na b l et oﬁnd such a price index for the UK. We did re-estimate
the models using the non-durable consumer goods price index from the BLS in the United
States. Doing so made little change in the point estimates. However, the test statistics in
Table 3 for the DI and RA models were considerably larger. We conclude that our use of the
CPI for all goods did not aﬀect our results in important ways.
In our formulation of the DI model, we assume that all agents participate in the asset
markets, and that no agent ever faces a binding short-sales constraint in those markets. In
reality, it is likely that at least some agents do face such binding constraints. To allow for
this possibility, we need information about household asset holdings. There is no information
about asset holdings in the FES. In the CEX, households are asked in their ﬁfth interview
about their current asset holdings and about the change in their asset holdings relative to
a year before. We ﬁrst eliminate all households in the sample that do not complete all
interviews. We then discard all those who did not report positive holdings of stocks and
bonds in their second interview.
We re-estimate the DI model using this sample of households from the CEX (without
changing the selected sample from the FES). The results in Table 1 did not change, the point
estimate of γ in Table 2 became negative, and the point estimate of γ in Table 3 became small
30and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We concluded that accounting for binding short-sales
constraints and/or non-participation in this fashion did not help the performance of the DI
model.10
10We reach similar conclusions in our earlier paper (Kocherlakota and Pistaferri (2005)).
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Note: Under the null hypothesis of each model, the true slope coeﬃcient is zero. Standard
errors are of the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) form but downweight higher order correlations as in Newey
and West (1987) to ensure positive deﬁn i t e n e s s .T h en u m b e ro fl a g su s e di st h r e e .
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Note: Under the null hypothesis, the intercept term α is equal to zero. In the incomplete
markets case, the usual asymptotic formulae for standard errors cannot be used because there are
no parameters that set the minimized objective equal to zero, even though the model is exactly
identiﬁed. Standard errors are of the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) form but downweight higher order
correlations as in Newey and West (1987) to ensure positive deﬁniteness. The number of lags used
is three.
Table 3










J-stat. 0.0004 3.9927 10.2259
Note: Standard errors are of the Hansen-Hodrick (1980) form but downweight higher order
correlations as in Newey and West (1987) to ensure positive deﬁniteness. The number of lags used
is three. The J-statistic has a χ2(1) asymptotic distribution under the null.
337. Conclusion
Backus and Smith (1993) consider a model in which all countries have a representative
agent and markets are complete. They prove that in this setting, the growth rate in the real
exchange rate should equal the diﬀerence in marginal utility growth rates in every date and
state. They show that this restriction is not satisﬁed by available exchange rate data.
In this paper, we relax the assumption that there is a representative agent in each
country, and instead assume that agents can only partially share person-speciﬁc risks within
each country. We consider two forms of limited risk-sharing: ﬁrst, Pareto optimal risk-sharing
conditional on asymmetric information about skills, and second, competitive exchange of a
limited set of securities. We derive analogs of the Backus-Smith restriction for these two
forms of risk-sharing. We show that this analog restriction ﬁts the data in the constrained
Pareto optimal case, at least for coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion around 5. In Kocherlakota
and Pistaferri (2005), we show that the PIPO model rationalizes the equity premium in the
United States when the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is also around 5.
Our analysis is limited in a number of respects. Nonetheless, we believe that our
results are quite suggestive. There are a large number of asset pricing and trade anomalies in
international economics. Our results indicate that limited within-country risk-sharing might
help explain at least some of these.
There are at least a couple of useful directions for future research. We treat the real
exchange rate in isolation. It would be informative to explore the ability of the model(s) to
rationalize ﬁnancial asset returns in multiple countries, together with the real exchange rate.
The work of Brandt et al. (2005) suggests that this test would be a stringent one.
We do not evaluate the ability of either model to generate the observed cross-sectional
34distribution of consumption in the United States or United Kingdom. We believe that taking
this step is an essential one to build further conﬁdence in the PIPO model. Doing so requires
us to solve two diﬃcult problems. First, we have to ﬁnd a way to measure the process
generating productivity shocks and aggregate shocks. Then, given that process, we have to
solve for the data generation process for the cross-sectional distribution of consumption. We
hope to make progress on these questions in future research.
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388. Appendix: The CEX
Each annual tape of the CEX contains four groups of core ﬁles, MTAB, ITAB, FMLY,
and MEMB. There are also many auxiliary ﬁles, which are not used here. The FMLY, MEMB,
MTAB, and ITAB ﬁles are organized by the calendar quarter of the year in which the data
are collected. The FMLY ﬁles contain household characteristics, income, and summary level
expenditures; the MEMB ﬁles contain member characteristics and income data; the MTAB
ﬁles contain expenditures organized on a monthly basis at the Universal Classiﬁcation Code
(UCC) level; and the ITAB ﬁles contain income data converted to a monthly time frame and
assigned to UCCs.
There are ﬁve quarterly data sets for each of these ﬁles. For example, in the 1980 tape,
there are ﬁles running from the ﬁrst quarter of 1980 through the ﬁrst quarter of 1981. This
is for the purpose of allowing computation of calendar year statistics. In fact, the MTAB
1980:Q1 ﬁle, say, contains expenditure information as reported by households interviewed in
the ﬁrst quarter of 1980. Since households report data for the previous three months, the
1980:Q1 ﬁle, say, has expenditure data from October 1979 to February 1980. The 1981:Q1
ﬁle is included in the 1980 tape because it contains information that spans the last three
months of 1980. With just two exceptions (discussed below), the Y:Q1 ﬁle contained in the
Y−1 tape is identical to the Y:Q1 ﬁle contained in the Y tape. The FMLY ﬁle for a given
quarter has one record per household. Similarly, the MEMB ﬁle for a given quarter has one
record per household member.
The CEX has three “household tracking” problems, detailed as follows. In 1980—1981
households that re-entered the survey after missing an interview were assigned a new ID.
While this is probably a minor proportion of the whole sample, it is for all purposes not a
39problem in our context, given that we do not focus on the longitudinal aspect of the survey. In
1986 the CEX changed its sample design. The consequence of this is that the core 1986:Q1 ﬁles
c o n t a i n e di nt h e1 9 8 5t a p es u r v e yd i ﬀerent households than the core 1986:Q1 ﬁles contained
in the 1986 tape. Indeed, issuing of household IDs starts from scratch beginning with the
1986 tape. Again, this is not a problem for us. We use both “samples,” and so end up with
a size that is larger than usual. Another sample design change occurs in 1996, but in this
case some of the households that are surveyed in the core 1996:Q1 ﬁles contained in the 1995
tape appear also in the core 1996:Q1 ﬁles of the 1996 tape, although with the same ID. Of
course, we eliminate the duplicates.
We use the MTAB ﬁles from 1980:Q1 throughout 2004:Q1 to create monthly expen-
diture records for each household ever surveyed in the CEX. Since households report data
for at most four quarters, there are between 3 and 12 observations per household. We merge
this information with household characteristics from the FMLY ﬁle. The ﬁle so compiled
contains 1,848,352 observations (where, to reiterate, each observation is a household/month
data point).
Our measure of nondurable consumption is as in Attanasio and Weber (1995), and
it is the sum of the following items (the UCC codes are in parentheses):11 Food at home
(790220, 790230, 190904), Food away from home (190901-190903, 790410, 790430, 800700),
Alcohol (200900, 790310, 790320, 790420), Tobacco (630110, 630210), Clothing and footwear
(360110-420120), clothing services (440110-440140, 440210, 440900), Fuel, light and power
(the sum of Heating (250111-250904), Gas (260211-260214), Electricity (260111-260114)),
11Erich Battistin at IFS kindly provided assistance in replicating Attanasio and Weber’s aggregation
procedures.
40Telephone communications (270000-270104, 270310), Housing (the sum of Water and sewer-
age (270211-270214, 270411-270414, 270901-270904), Rent (210110-210902, 800710, 350110),
Home insurance (220111-220122), Home maintenance and repairs (230111-230902, 330511,
340914, 790600), and Other home services (340510-340530, 340906, 340911-340912, 340915)),
Domestic services (the sum of Babysitting (340210-340212) and Other domestic services
(340310-340420)), Public transport (530110-530902), Private transport (the sum of Vehicle
expenses (520110-520907), Gasoline and oil (470111-470212), Vehicle maintenance and re-
pairs (470220-490900), and Parking fees (220901-220902)), Entertainment (the sum of Club
membership fees (620110-620115), Ticket admissions (620121-620310), and Miscellaneous en-
tertainment expenses (610900, 620330-620926)), and Miscellaneous expenditures (the sum of
Newspapers and magazines (590110-590212), Books (590220-590230), Personal care (650110-
650900), and Rentals (340610-340905, 340907-340908, 440150).
Here is a description of our sample selection. As said, we start with 1,848,352 monthly
observations. We drop 164,137 observations for which our measure of total nondurable con-
sumption is missing or zero. We further drop 4,259 observations for households that report
zero food spending (at home and away from home) during an entire interview (three-month
period). Households interviewed in a certain month are supposed to report consumption data
only for the previous three months. We drop 4,116 observations reporting data for the same
month in which they are interviewed. We next eliminate 398,047 observations corresponding
to households that are classiﬁed as “incomplete income respondents” or report less than three
months of data for a given interview. At this point, we aggregate monthly data in (overlap-
ping) quarters, indexed by the last month in the quarter. The resulting sample has 425,931
quarterly observations, corresponding to 147,412 households. We drop 9,635 observations
41corresponding to households that jump interviews (i.e., exit and re-enter the survey), and
5,498 observations corresponding to households living in college dorms. We end up with a
ﬁnal sample of 410,798 quarterly observations, or 140,364 households.
9. Appendix: The FES
The FES is composed of various modules: The Household schedule A (which asks ques-
tions about demographics, housing, durables), the Income schedule B (which asks questions
about employment, wages, transfers, assets), the Diary of expenditure schedule D (which
asks questions about expenditure on goods and services), the Checking schedule K and the
Checking and outcome schedule K+L (which ask a number of consistency check questions),
the England, Wales, and Northern Ireland—only schedule M (which asks questions — espe-
cially about publicly provided housing — pertinent to all countries but Scotland), and the
Northern Ireland schedule N.I. (which asks questions — especially about publicly provided
housing — only pertinent to Northern Ireland). Household expenditure on nondurable goods
and services, described below, uses information from schedules A, B, and D.
The expenditure codes in the FES have changed several times between 1968 and 2004.
In what follows, we report the expenditure codes and their allocation to the various con-
sumption categories for a single representative year, 1990. For other years, the allocation
is similar, although it is based on diﬀerent expenditure codes.12 The deﬁnition of non-
durable consumption and services includes the following expenditure categories:13 Food at
12We thank Orazio Attanasio and Andrew Leicester for providing information on the allocation procedure.
13The acronym “A” before an expenditure code indicates that the data come from the Household schedule
A. The acronym “B” before an expenditure code indicates that the data come from the Income schedule B. A
superscript − on an expenditure code means that the value is subtracted from the total. Expenditure codes
without acronyms come from the Diary of Expenditures schedule D.
42home (101-137, 139-195, 198-199), Food away from home (840-857, 138, 196-197), Alco-
hol (260-289), Tobacco (211-213), Fuel, light and power (the sum of Coal and solid fuel
(240,242,A321), Electricity (225,255,175,B222,B178−), Gas (226,254,B170,B221,B173−), and
Other fuels (258,B017,B027)), Telephone communications (227,752,B166), Housing (the sum
of Rent, Rates and community charges, Repair and maintenance (B102,B104,B107,B108),
Own repair (232-238), Mortgage payments (B130,B198-B200), and Home insurance (B60,B110)),
Domestic services (the sum of Domestic help (780), Repairs (782,788), and Laundry ser-
vices (790,791)), Clothing and footwear (301-349), Private transports (the sum of Mainte-
nance (510,513,514,545,546,548,549), Gasoline and oil (538,539,542), Vehicle tax and insur-
ance (512,B187,B188,B179), and others (555,556)), Public transports (the sum of Rail fares
(550,551,B216,B218,B220), Bus and coach fares (552,B217), Air travel (553), and School
travel (B158)), Entertainment (the sum of TV license (229,760,768,B181), TV and cable
rental (B195,B253,B254), Fees and admissions to events (753,755,761,763,764,765,B162), Ho-
tels (B441-B452), and Holidays (754-759)), and Miscellaneous items (the sum of Household
consumables (437,623,648,742,746), Petcare (731,732), Postage (751), Fees and subscrip-
tions (219,220,228,770,772,796,797,799,805,806,807,B168,B180,B273,B280-B283), Gardening
(733,734), and Books, newspapers, and magazines (721-723)).
We use the FES ﬁles to create bi-weekly expenditure records for each household ever
surveyed in the FES. There is a single record for each household. In other words, there is no
panel component in the FES. The ﬁle so compiled (after excluding households from Northern
Ireland, less than 2% of the sample, and those for which our measure of total nondurable
consumption is missing or zero) contains 172,163 observations (approximately 7,000 per year).
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Figure 1: To construct each graph, we regress the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of the appropriate
SDF ratio on the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log of the real exchange rate. We then plot the
resultant projection and ﬁrst diﬀe r e n c eo ft h el o go ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea g a i n s tt i m e .
44